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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between policies facilitating domestic economic 
freedom in Sub-Saharan African states and the degree of regional integration of those states 
into their respective regional economic communities. It conducts a linear regression analysis 
with data from the Economic Freedom of the World Report 2017 and the AFRICA Regional 
Integration Index to conduct a quantitative study of Sub-Saharan African states. The regression 
finds strong evidence that domestic economic freedom is a significant contributing factor, 
between 5% and 15% causality, to a state’s degree of regional integration. The paper 
hypothesizes that private sector political and economic activity is the causal mechanism for 
such a relationship. It examines the case study of Botswana to test this hypothesis in a 
plausibility probe, examining policies across time, and especially the establishment of 




Domestic Economic Freedom and Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Introduction 
The African community has pursued regional integration of various types since the end 
of colonialism. National, regional, and international actors regularly express support for 
regional integration, though the effectiveness of integration schemes and the actual 
commitment of actors to the project have been spotty at best. Nonetheless, regional 
integration, at least as an ideal, has seen strong and consistent support from the African Union, 
the African Development Bank, the United Nations, and other important players. Stefan 
Nelletamby, Acting Vice President of the Infrastructure, Private Sector and Regional Integration 
section at the African Development Bank, writes that: 
Integration is at the foundation of Africa’s future. A future that will be 
forged by its 1.1 billion citizens and growing young population; a future of 
opportunities with a marketplace of 54 countries and growing consumer 
purchasing power; and a future where Africa is open for business with the 
rest of the world, competing in higher value goods and services.1 
 
Up until recently, measures of regional integration were irregular and created a “knowledge 
gap.”2 However, with the completion of the AFRICA Regional Integration Index, a project 
created by the collaboration of the African Union, the African Development Bank Group, and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, we now have the first comprehensive 
measure of regional integration across every nation and regional economic community in Africa 
                                                                
1 “Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” African Union Commission, African Development Bank Group, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, (2015), https://www.integrate-
africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ARII-Report2016_EN_web.pdf, 5. 
2 “Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 5. 
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with which to “identify particular strengths and gaps…[and] follow their progress and changes 
over time.”3  
The index, which has defined indicators and dimensions by which integration can be 
measured, does not make any causal claims as to why some states are more integrated than 
others. This leaves open the question of what potential causal factors aid or hinder regional 
integration. While there are innumerable possible angles with which to approach this new 
wealth of data, this project will focus on an often understudied factor in regional integration: 
domestic economic freedom.  
This quantitative and qualitative study will attempt to answer the following question: do 
domestic reforms supporting economic freedom facilitate regional integration? This is broad 
question, but its answer will prove most poignant for states where regional integration and its 
economic benefits are the least realized. Sub-Saharan African presents a test set with numerous 
observations and enormous practical application because states similar to the average African 
state likely have the most to benefit from increased regional integration. For this reason, this 
study will determine if there is a robust relationship between the degree of regional integration 
into RECs and domestic policies facilitating economic freedom in Sub-Saharan African states. 
Even if this is found, however, a purely quantitative study cannot establish the mechanisms for 
such a relationship. A case study Botswana will be used to resolve this and attempt to draw out 
the causal links.  
As already noted, states in Sub-Saharan African have long espoused the goal of 
increasing regional and continental integration, but progress has been mixed since the 
                                                                
3 “Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 7. 
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formation of the African Union and the gradual proliferation of regional economic organizations 
(RECs). Many integration efforts, such as those originating in the 1970s, have focused on 
regional governmental cooperation, reducing tariffs, and other macro-level integration 
methods of various kinds. While these factors are no doubt important, this macro-level 
integration has faced numerous challenges. As De Melo and Tsikata point out, if regional 
integration efforts are entirely dependent on political actors, then progress will be particularly 
difficult and sporadic because the issue becomes political in nature.4 Intergovernmental 
conflicts have historically been a barrier to regional integration, the most dramatic example 
being the disbanding of the East African Community in 1977 due to Tanzania and Uganda going 
to war.  
On the economic side, tariffs, currency stability, and freedom of movement have long 
been the focus of integration advocates. While these are essential factors, the focus on these 
has arguably marginalized research into the importance of eliminating domestic factors, such as 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which create smaller but crucial transaction costs for the private 
sector. While regional integration is and must be a project of national governments, private 
actors (firms and individuals) will necessarily be doing much of the actual work of integration. In 
addition, should the private sector have the capacity to pursue regional projects and exchanges 
across national lines due to positive incentives (domestic economic freedom), it could help 
create a positive feedback loop and put pressure on political actors to overcome other macro-
level economic, political, and social barriers to integration.  
                                                                
4 Jaime De Melo and Yvonne Tsikata, "Regional Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects," IDEAS Working 




Regional Integration and Regional Economic Communities 
Regional integration can be understood in a variety of ways, but it always involves 
increased interaction and coordination between and among generally geographically proximate 
states. These interactions can take the form of economic agreements (like the North American 
Free Trade Agreement) or of more complex governmental structures (like in the European 
Union). One can identify several levels of regional integration, ordered according to increasing 
integration commitment: free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, economic 
unions, and political unions. Sub-Saharan African RECs generally fall into the first three 
categories.5 Worldwide, states pursue regional integration… 
…not only to increase cross-border trade and investment but also to raise citizens’ 
living standards and pursue other legitimate national interests such as 
governance, security, human development, social-cultural exchanges, migration, 
and raising the country’s geopolitical position in the region or globally.6 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, regional integration and regionalism are often referred to in both 
political and economic terms and generally are viewed as a response or reaction to the 
globalizing economy.7 As previously noted, increased regional integration seems to be a near 
universal point of agreement among relevant actors.  
                                                                
5 Moses Kiggundu and Kaitlyn DeGhetto, “Regional Integration: Review of the Management Literature and 
Implications for Theory, Policy, and Practice,” Africa Journal of Management 2015 1 (4): 305. Kiggundu and 
DeGhetto define the three relevant types as follows: “Free Trade Area: Partner countries agree to remove tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade, but each member decides its own barriers against nonmembers….Customs Union: 
Partner countries remove all barriers to trade among themselves, erect a common trade policy against 
nonmembers….Common Market: Combines free trade and customs union by removing all barriers to trade and the 
movement of labor and capital among members. Members erect a common trade policy against nonmembers….”  
6 Ibid., 304.  
7 Ian Taylor and Fredrik Soderbaum. “Region-Building Beyond the State: Modes of Regional Governance in Africa,” 
in The New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific, Ed. Ulf, Routledge 
Studies in Globalisation, London ; New York: Routledge, 2017, 134. 
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A recent expression of this agreement is the 2016 AFRICA Regional Integration Index. 
Resulting from the combined efforts of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union 
Commission (AUC), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the index is an extensive 
quantitative examination of regional integration across Africa. Most simply put, the index 
measures regional integration in terms of five Dimensions and sixteen Indicators grouped under 
them (see fig. 1).  
 
fig.1 (“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 11.) 
Regional economic communities (RECs), are the primary method by which the African states 
hopes to increase regional integration. These economic communities, as the name indicates, 
are intended to initially be regional, with the eventual goal of a continental African economic 
community. For this reason, the index’s Dimensions and Indicators are measured for each state 
qua member of a regional economic community.  
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The African Union (AU) recognizes eight RECs in Africa: CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel–
Saharan States); COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa); EAC (East African 
Community); ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States); ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States); IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development); 
SADC (Southern African Development Community); and UMA (Arab Maghreb Union).8 Most 
African states are members of more than one REC, and some have memberships in as many as 
three RECs concurrently (see fig. 2). 
  
fig.2 (“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 16.) 
However, RECs in Sub-Saharan Africa are not always directly comparable. They often have 
different foci or emphases, and demand differing levels of commitment from member states. 
                                                                
8 While UMA is a REC under the AU, this study will focus on Sub-Saharan Africa RECs—the other seven.  
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This is reflected in the African Development Bank’s measurements of their five dimensions of 
regional integration. For example, ECOWAS scores the highest of the RECs on Dimension 4, the 
free movement of people, but relatively low on Dimension 1, trade integration. The EAC, 
however, scores the highest on trade integration, but the lowest on Dimension 5, financial and 
macroeconomic integration. Among all RECs, Dimensions 2 and 3, regional infrastructure and 
productive integration, have the least variation in scores, with average scores fairly close 
together.9 That said, the AFRICA Regional Integration Index measures all RECs according to the 
same criteria, and final index scores are combinations of the all Dimension and Indicator scores.  
 
Why Regional Integration? 
Regional integration has been a priority for African leadership in part because Sub-
Saharan African states are poorly positioned in the global market. To start, Sub-Saharan African 
states are “not a party to any…mega-regional trade negotiations” such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership negotiations.10 And with the failure of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round, 
“the risk for Africa in this is that new rules and market access preferences agreed under the 
mega-regional FTAs will make it increasingly difficult for African businesses to compete 
globally.”11 To compensate for this and other historic economic disadvantages, regional 
integration has long been an attractive prospect. 12 Research consistently shows that regional 
                                                                
9 “Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 16-17 
10 Joshua P. Meltzer, “Expanding African Trade: Creating a Comparative Advantage and Strengthening Regional 
Partnerships,” In Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2016, 2016: 91. 
11 Ibid., 91. 
12 Some scholars argue that regional integration efforts that point towards competition global market  ultimately 
undermine the well-being of Africans by making governments facilitators of global capital “rather than  the  
protector  against  these  forces,  which  is  the  classical  task  of   mercantilist  nation-  building  and  public  
governance” (Taylor and Soderbaum, 138). Their critique is more specifically of “neoliberalism” and how it results 
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integration and more open trade policy results in economic improvement both in individual 
member states of RECs and as a whole.13 
Regional integration has also been seen as a way to ease the entry of Sub-Saharan 
African economies into the global economy. African firms could start with “the dynamic but 
more easily accessible African markets” to prepare “for the greater rigor and competition in 
global value chains.”14 This could be especially valuable for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), as they “are more likely to succeed in regional markets first, where they are more 
familiar with the buyers’ tastes and the standard requirements.”15  
Another reason regional integration has been a consistent topic studied in Africa 
economics is that integration, in its various forms, can help overcome geographical struggles. 
Fifteen states in Sub-Saharan Africa are landlocked, which is “an important contributory factor 
to high trade transaction costs, and more generally to the high costs of doing business in 
Africa.” 16 These geographical struggles are not the product of domestic politics but were 
“largely determined by the continent’s European colonial powers.” 17 All together, these factors 
make a “compelling case for these economies to integrate regionally to reap efficiency gains, 
exploit economies of scale, and reduce the thickness of borders.”18 
                                                                
in the “commodification of basic material needs and everyday life” and retreat of the conventional welfare and 
development ambitions of the state” (Taylor and Soderbaum, 138).  
13 Njoroge Kamau, “The Impact of Regional Integration on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from COMESA, 
EAC and SADC Trade Blocs,”  American Journal of Social and Management Sciences 2010, 1(2): 150-163 
14 Soamiely Andriamananjara, “Regional Route to Global Value Chains.” In Foresight Africa: Top priorities for the 
continent in 2016, 2016: 94. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Trudi Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration in Africa," WTO Staff Working Paper ERS-2011-14, 2011: 3 
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 1.  
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In addition to economic benefits, regional trade agreements often increase the 
opportunity cost of war, and thus reduce its risk.19 In addition, regional trade agreements can 
“reduce information asymmetries as partners know each other better” and reduce “incentives 
for countries not to report their true options in an attempt to extract concessions.” 20 21 Finally, 
regional trade agreements can “provide security and confidence to build supra-national 
institutions” capable of providing benefits to much larger areas.22  
  
Challenges and Prospects 
Despite this potential, regional integration efforts face numerous hurdles. First, regional 
economic communities are not all built alike and vary widely in effectiveness—the AFRICA 
Regional Integration Index scores demonstrate this. In addition, Aryeetey notes that regional 
organizations in sub-Saharan Africa tend to suffer from numerous detracting features, including 
the “existence of multiple objectives,” “absence of strong supranational institutions,” 
“inadequate sanctioning authority,” “lack of political commitment,” and “poor private sector 
participation.”23 Asserting that states in Africa “lack the cultural, political and historical 
closeness essential to any common endeavor,24 Chinsinga argues that “the inherent diversity 
saps or drains any political will, however rudimentary, upon which the eventual success of 
                                                                
19 Ibid., 8. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Principles of International Politics, 5th ed. Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 2014. 
22 De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 7. 
23 Ernest Aryeetey, “Sub-Saharan African Experiences with Regional Integration,” In Regional Integration and Trade 
Liberalization in Subsaharan Africa, Ed. T. Ademola Oyejide, Elbadawi Ibrahim, and Paul Collier. 410-11 
24 Sandro Sideri, "Globalisation and Regional Integration," The European Journal of Development Research 9, no. 1 
(1997): 38-82.  
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regional integration initiatives depend.25 Chinsinga also adds that African economies are often 
ill-suited to build comparative advantages due to similar export portfolios, weak government 
institutions that cannot deliver basic services and infrastructure, and the aforementioned 
historically contentious political differences.26  
In addition, regional integration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa has historically focused on 
“market access at the expense of outsiders” and often ignored “the importance of tackling 
behind-the-border impediments to trade”. 27 These “behind-the-border impediments to trade” 
often take the form of non-tariff barriers. These non-tariff barriers (NTBs) “hindering regional 
trade in the east and southern African region (COMESA, the EAC and SADC) include customs 
procedures and administrative requirements, technical standards and the lack of physical 
infrastructure.”28 These raise transaction costs and inhibit business across borders, which is 
especially problematic because “the private sector will be responsible for the bulk of economic 
decisions which are the fabric of regional integration.”29  
 This shift of focus to non-tariff barriers and the private sector, however, reveals 
opportunity along with the problem. If political differences between national governments is an 
strong impediment, as numerous scholars suggest, and if non-tariff barriers within (not just 
among) states play heavily in preventing further regional integration, then at least a partial 
                                                                
25 Ibid., 118 
26 Blessings Chinsinga, “The Challenges of Globalisation and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African 
Development Community,” In Democracy, Human Rights and Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa, Ed. by 
Milazi, Dominic., Mulinge, Munyae M, Mukamaambo, Elizabeth, and Africa Institute of South Africa,  African 
Century Publications Series; No. 9. Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa in Collaboration with 
SAUSSC, 2002:117 
27 De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 19. 
28 Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 16 
29 Ibid., 19 
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solution may be found in the private sector and in focusing on domestic policy.30 If “the private 
sector will be responsible for the bulk of economic decisions which are the fabric of regional 
integration,” then domestic policy facilitating private sector activity may be key to integration 
on a larger scale.31 In concert with this concept, Aryeetey suggests that the “growing the 
number of firms with an export potential will increase the domestic lobby for further regional 
trade liberalization,” citing the West African Enterprise Network, a “coalition of business 
people” who lobby to “reduce existing barriers and encourage the flow of capital and service in 
the region” as an example.32 
 That said, the development of supra-national organizations will, by definition, be 
essential to regional integration efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the “the region’s most 
significant response” currently to address the many issues facing it is a substantial supra-nation 
reorganization.33 This is formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area—a 
merging of three RECs. This proposed integration of three of the highest performing RECs34, if 
successful, would represent a major continental commitment to regional (and continental) 
integration projects. It would also address several major issues that have caused regional 
integration efforts to stumble in the past: 
[The] tripartite FTA among COMESA, EAC, and SADC that should help solve 
the overlapping membership dilemma by bringing free trade among the 26 
members by: (i) removing tariffs and NTBs and implementing trade 
facilitation…(ii) applying the subsidiarity principle to infrastructure to 
improve the transport network; (iii) foster industrial development.35 
 
                                                                
30 This hypothesis is the focus of this study’s quantitative and qualitative work. 
31 Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 19 
32 Aryeetey, “Sub-Saharan African Experiences,” 414. 
33 Meltzer, “Expanding African Trade,” 91. 
34 Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 13-14 
35 De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 19-20 
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The Tripartite FTA shows promise: as of February 18th 2018, the agreement has 22 state 
signatories out of the full 26.36 But even though this supra-national organization has potential 
to solve several organizational and bureaucratic issues, each state within it will still likely need 
to adopt policies to facilitate integration into the Tripartite FTA. Here again, we may see the 
importance of domestic policy aimed at the private sector—specifically, policy that promotes 
economic freedom.  
In short, while most theories of regional integration identify the private sector as an 
important set of actors, it is often unclear how much of a causal role it theoretically plays in the 
construction of regional integration. One set of recommendations for regional integration lists 
numerous causal factors, but focuses on “economic development at the regional level” and 
policy makers developing “public infrastructure and human capital.”37 While the list does 
recommend “an increase in the efficiency of the small-scale-production/informal sector,” the 
focus is overwhelmingly on “policy coordination, institutional consolidation and administrative 
partnerships” at the regional level.38 In this view, the onus of integration rests on the regional 
level and successful negotiations between the various states. While pro-business policies are 
generally a part of such negotiations, in much of the literature they are represented as 
necessarily taking place in the framework of these regional negotiations with regional oversight 
and coordination. This project veers from this type of analysis in order to examine purely 
                                                                
36 Phillip Kambafwile. “22 Countries Have Now Signed the Tripartite Agreement.” Common Market for Eastern & 
Southern Africa. February 16. http://www.comesa.int/22-countries-have-now-signed-the-tripartite-agreement/. 
37 Norbert Fiess and Marco Fugazza, “European Integration: A Review of the Literature and Lessons for NAFTA,” 




domestic policy and the possible causality of organic private sector action fomenting regional 
integration.  
 
Economic Freedom  
 Economic freedom is a broad concept, but in general it refers to the ability of individuals 
and firms to undertake voluntary transactions in a marketplace. In a global world, this simple 
understanding becomes complicated as forces and actors on multiple levels regulate, facilitate, 
encourage, and discourage these transactions. The Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 
Annual Report utilizes data from as far back as 1970 and attempts to define and document 
“economic freedom” around the globe. The report describes economic freedom: 
The cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary 
exchange, open markets, and clearly defined and enforced property rights. 
Individuals are economically free when they are permitted to choose for 
themselves and engage in voluntary transactions as long as they do not 
harm the person or property of others. When economic freedom is 
present, the choices of individuals will decide what and how goods and 
services are produced. Put another way, economically free individuals will 
be permitted to decide for themselves rather than having options imposed 
on them by the political process or the use of violence, theft, or fraud by 
others.39 
 
The Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report index breaks down economic 
freedom into five key areas for measurement: “[1] Size of Government, [2] Legal System and 
Property Rights, [3] Sound Money [4] Freedom to Trade Internationally, and [5] Regulation of 
credit, labor, and business.”40 There areas are further broken down into set and subsets of 42 
                                                                
39 Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike, Richard Grant, Fred McMahon, 
Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati. The Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report, 2017, Policy 
File: 1 
40 Ibid., 3  
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variables. States receive scores in each of the five area as well as an overall score.41 Overall, the 
index represents an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of economic freedom in a given state.  
 This study will focus specifically on domestic economic freedom and will be using scores 
from two of the five key areas the Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report 
measures: “Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation.” These two areas would likely 
directly deal with the transaction costs and non-tariff barriers that preclude regional 
integration. In addition, these are two factors that a private sector (which is necessary for much 
of the legwork of regional integrating) would watch closely. With the theory of private sector 
action as essential to regional integration, policies that facilitate domestic economic freedom 
and a strong business environment should have a positive relationship with a degree of regional 
integration.  
Area two of the Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report, “Legal System 




                                                                
41 Ibid., 3. The report describes the methodology as follows: “Each component (and sub-component) is placed on a 
scale from 0 to 10 that reflects the distribution of the underlying data. When sub-components are present, the 
sub-component ratings are averaged to derive the component rating. The component ratings within each area are 
then averaged to derive ratings for each of the five areas. In turn, the five area ratings are averaged to derive the 




fig. 3 (Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike, 
Richard Grant, Fred McMahon, Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati, Economic 
Freedom, 4) 
These components all fall within the realm of domestic politics, and do not necessarily have a 
direct effect of regional integration—in other words, they are not necessarily connected to 
policymaking specifically aimed at creating stronger regional ties. Should the data analysis show 
a relationship between these components and regional integration, then, we may have 
evidence toward the causal story of private sector actors. If nothing else, a strong score in this 
category may simply mean that the potential to build capital exists, which would make possible 
capital investments into regional projects. As Hernando De Soto noted, without strong property 
rights, capital is “dead”—only with “institutions that give life to capital” can prosperity exist.42 
Area five of the Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report index, 




                                                                
42 Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, 




fig. 4 (Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike, 
Richard Grant, Fred McMahon, Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati, Economic 
Freedom, 4)  
In the same vein as the previous area, each of these components and sub-components are 
shaped by domestic policy and have a significant effect on the private sector. In the context of 
regional integration, the difficulties of expanding into a regional business and entering new 
areas and states would entail a significant investment. If domestic policies regarding hiring, 
administrative requirements, bribes, etc. compound the cost of entering into the market, it 
would discourage both domestic and regional growth and investment. In addition, several of 
these components fall into the non-tariff barrier category discussed previously.  
 
Quantitative Methodology 
This analysis will utilize linear regression to test the relationship between regional 
integration and domestic economic freedom in Sub-Saharan African states. While various 
international agencies define Sub-Saharan Africa (in contrast to “North Africa”) as including 
differing numbers of states, for this study, “Sub-Saharan Africa” will use the World Bank’s 48-
17 
 
state definition. This larger number of states provides more data to analyze (in contrast to the 
UNDP’s 46-state definition). Practically, using this 48-state list includes nearly all members of 
the African Union-recognized Regional Economic Communities (excluding the Arab Maghreb 
Union and its members). The sample used in this analysis is the entire population of Sub-
Saharan African states, with the exception of three states (Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan) 
which lacked the necessary data to contribute to the analysis. In addition to assessing the 
population of Sub-Saharan states, this study will also test a subset of the data from three RECs: 
the SADC, EAC, and COMESA. This appears relevant given the continuing development of the 
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement between the three RECs discussed in the previous sections. 
The Dependent Variable (DV), regional integration, comes from data from the AFRICA 
Regional Integration Index. This index (further defined in section 3), measures each African 
state's integration into their RECs. The DV is defined as instances of regional integration of Sub-
Saharan African states in RECs. The 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa are members of seven RECs, 
but nearly every state has memberships in two or more RECs. For example, there exist 
instances, data points, of Kenya's regional integration into the EAC, CEN-SAD, COMESA, and 
IGAD. In the data analysis, this means that the state of Kenya provides four instances of 
regional integration to examine. Each of these instances are measured against the same 
independent variable of domestic economic freedom. There are two objections to this method 
that should be addressed. 
The first objection questions the idea of testing instances of integration as opposed to 
states as a whole. However, there is no way to aggregate a state's integration to RECs or its 
neighbors as a whole. The purpose of this study is to test if domestic economic policy, 
18 
 
specifically policy that supports private actors, has a discernible effect on a state's integration 
into any and all RECs. The IV is necessarily constant because, for example, Kenya's domestic 
economic policies (“Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation") do not change when 
testing Kenya's integration into various RECs.  
A second objection is that multiple instances of identical IV scores (for Kenya, this would 
be four identical IV scores) skew the data towards showing a positive relationship. This is not 
the case. Kenya's IV score may be relatively high (7.11), but its DV scores vary from .344-.773. 
The AFRICA Regional Integration Index notes that  
Countries that are members of more than one REC show differences 
between their rankings and scores in a particular Dimension in one REC 
as opposed to another. This can be explained by historical links, 
comparative advantages, regional policies and geography.43 
 
In addition, RECs may have competition objectives and fulfilling one REC's requirements (thus 
gaining higher integration in one) may lower integration in another. In other words, there are 
numerous factors that affect a state's integration score that fall outside the scope of this 
analysis. However, the theoretical framework we are testing would argue that despite all these 
intervening variables, we should still see a relationship between the DV and IV because 
domestic economic policy would incentivize the private sector. Testing instances of integration 
actually strengthens this analysis by at least partially controlling for REC scores that can be 
explained by geographical closeness, historical links, or comparative advantages.   
The IV is defined as domestic economic freedom and is represented in two ways using 
data from the Economic Freedom of the World Report, using two sub-scores of “Legal System 
                                                                
43 “Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 39. 
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and Property Rights” and “Regulation" separately. While the EFW provides an "Overall" score 
for economic freedom which may be the broadest analysis, using that score in this analysis is 
inherently problematic. This is because some of its sub-scores (such as “Sound Money” and 
“Freedom to Trade Internationally”) potentially overlap and mix with Dimensions from the 
AFRICA Regional Integration Index (such as “Financial and Macroeconomic integration” and 
“Trade Integration”). 
The EFW report sub-scores of “Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation,” 
however, do not have immediate correlating Dimensions or Indicators in the AFRICA Regional 
Integration Index. In addition, these two measures are extremely important on the theoretical 
level. Theoretically, secure property rights and a relatively relaxed regulation regime should 
directly impact the transaction costs and non-tariff-barriers that disincentive the private sector 
and thus prevent integration. 
 
Data and Regression Results 
As noted above, this data uses the 48-state World Bank definition of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Sudan, and Sudan 
are excluded from this analysis due to lack of data in the Economic Freedom of the World 
Report, AFRICA Regional Integration Index, or both. The total observations of all other Sub-
Saharan states’ instances of regional integration is 77, and for the proposed tripartite union 
(the SADC, EAC, and COMESA) the observations totaled 33.  
20 
 
Note: The AFRICA Regional Integration Index scores states on a 0-1 scale, while the 
Economic Freedom of the World Report scores states on a 1-10 scale. These values were not 
changed for the analysis.  
Section 1: Legal System and Property Rights 
The first dataset is all instances of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa from the 
AFRICA Regional Integration Index paired with the corresponding “Legal System and Property 
Rights” from the Economic Freedom of the World Report. Instances are grouped by REC and 
descend in order of most integrated to least within each REC.  
 
REC Member State 
Regional Integration 
Score 
Legal System & Property 
Rights Score 
COMESA  
(adjusted) Kenya 0.573 4.745102997 
 Zambia 0.565 5.567048403 
 Uganda 0.52 4.891804412 
 Seychelles 0.506 5.520896302 
 Mauritius 0.47 6.472556637 
 Zimbabwe 0.454 3.820360033 
 Rwanda 0.45 7.32142152 
 Madagascar 0.42 2.881012258 
 Dem Rep of Congo 0.419 2.653119211 
 Malawi 0.412 4.621099644 
 Burundi 0.401 3.09182541 
 Swaziland 0.359 4.108752623 
 Ethiopia 0.233 4.607092409 
EAC Kenya 0.656 4.745102997 
 Uganda 0.577 4.891804412 
 Rwanda 0.553 7.32142152 
 Burundi 0.48 3.09182541 
 Tanzania 0.433 5.678049954 
SADC  
(adjusted) South Africa 0.741 5.762888284 
 Botswana 0.559 6.164800355 
 Namibia 0.555 6.511178933 
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 Zambia 0.523 5.567048403 
 Swaziland 0.52 4.108752623 
 Zimbabwe 0.488 3.820360033 
 Mozambique 0.483 3.96561253 
 Seychelles 0.481 5.520896302 
 Mauritius 0.466 6.472556637 
 Lesotho 0.386 5.762699818 
 Malawi 0.367 4.621099644 
 Tanzania 0.364 5.678049954 
 Madagascar 0.343 2.881012258 
 Dem Rep of Congo 0.302 2.653119211 
 Angola 0.281 2.960263718 
CEN-SAD  
(adjusted) Cote d'Ivoire 0.641 4.557106689 
 Benin 0.587 3.580765453 
 Togo 0.581 3.688572303 
 Senegal 0.569 4.237886203 
 Niger 0.553 3.414027157 
 Mali 0.542 3.626025957 
 Burkina Faso 0.538 3.597581138 
 Gambia 0.419 5.259634324 
 Ghana 0.418 5.44184396 
 Nigeria 0.384 3.609768459 
 Guinea 0.349 2.976011266 
 Kenya 0.344 4.745102997 
 Mauritania 0.331 3.280492271 
 Chad 0.329 2.76778205 
 Guinea-Bissau 0.322 3.860624883 
 
Central African 
Republic 0.303 1.849276407 
 Liberia 0.252 4.67597891 
ECCAS  
(adjusted) Cameroon 0.664 3.257379298 
 Gabon 0.58 3.900636296 
 Rep of Congo 0.531 3.408225775 
 Chad 0.512 2.76778205 
 
Central African 
Republic 0.507 1.849276407 
 Rwanda 0.485 7.32142152 
 Angola 0.325 2.960263718 
 Burundi 0.276 3.09182541 




(adjusted) Cote d'Ivoire 0.675 4.557106689 
 Togo 0.671 3.688572303 
 Senegal 0.628 4.237886203 
 Niger 0.556 3.414027157 
 Benin 0.548 3.580765453 
 Ghana 0.546 5.44184396 
 Burkina Faso 0.537 3.597581138 
 Mali 0.525 3.626025957 
 Nigeria 0.501 3.609768459 
 Guinea-Bissau 0.5 3.860624883 
 Gambia 0.447 5.259634324 
 Cape Verde 0.439 6.07731726 
 Liberia 0.357 4.67597891 
 Guinea 0.301 2.976011266 
 Sierra Leone 0.404 3.965239946 
IGAD Kenya 0.773 4.745102997 
 Uganda 0.701 4.891804412 





Multiple R 0.257637963 
R Square 0.06637732 
Adjusted R Square 0.053929017 








The second dataset is all instances of regional integration within the proposed tripartite 
union of the SADC, EAC, and COMESA from the AFRICA Regional Integration Index paired with 
the corresponding “Legal System and Property Rights” score from the Economic Freedom of the 
World Report. Instances are grouped by REC and descend in order of most integrated to least 
within each REC.  
 
REC Member State 
Regional Integration 
Score Legal System & Property Rights Score 
COMESA 
(adjusted) Kenya 0.573 4.745102997 








































 Uganda 0.52 4.891804412 
 Seychelles 0.506 5.520896302 
 Mauritius 0.47 6.472556637 
 Zimbabwe 0.454 3.820360033 
 Rwanda 0.45 7.32142152 
 Madagascar 0.42 2.881012258 
 
Dem Rep of 
Congo 0.419 2.653119211 
 Malawi 0.412 4.621099644 
 Burundi 0.401 3.09182541 
 Swaziland 0.359 4.108752623 
 Ethiopia 0.233 4.607092409 
EAC Kenya 0.656 4.745102997 
 Uganda 0.577 4.891804412 
 Rwanda 0.553 7.32142152 
 Burundi 0.48 3.09182541 
 Tanzania 0.433 5.678049954 
SADC 
(adjusted) South Africa 0.741 5.762888284 
 Botswana 0.559 6.164800355 
 Namibia 0.555 6.511178933 
 Zambia 0.523 5.567048403 
 Swaziland 0.52 4.108752623 
 Zimbabwe 0.488 3.820360033 
 Mozambique 0.483 3.96561253 
 Seychelles 0.481 5.520896302 
 Mauritius 0.466 6.472556637 
 Lesotho 0.386 5.762699818 
 Malawi 0.367 4.621099644 
 Tanzania 0.364 5.678049954 
 Madagascar 0.343 2.881012258 
 
Dem Rep of 
Congo 0.302 2.653119211 




Multiple R 0.431303391 
R Square 0.186022615 
Adjusted R Square 0.15976528 








Section 2: Regulation 
The first dataset consists of all instances of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
from the AFRICA Regional Integration Index paired with the corresponding “Regulation” score 
from the Economic Freedom of the World Report. Instances are grouped by REC and descend in 
order of most integrated to least within each REC.  
REC Member State Regional Integration Score Regulation Score 
COMESA 
(adjusted) Kenya 0.573 7.285672899 








































 Uganda 0.52 7.894807884 
 Seychelles 0.506 7.39581686 
 Mauritius 0.47 8.186706935 
 Zimbabwe 0.454 4.308080892 
 Rwanda 0.45 8.37415247 
 Madagascar 0.42 5.864701176 
 Dem Rep of Congo 0.419 5.743211571 
 Malawi 0.412 5.750041671 
 Burundi 0.401 7.274866867 
 Swaziland 0.359 7.625161417 
 Ethiopia 0.233 6.046571454 
EAC Kenya 0.656 7.285672899 
 Uganda 0.577 7.894807884 
 Rwanda 0.553 8.37415247 
 Burundi 0.48 7.274866867 
 Tanzania 0.433 7.26060323 
SADC 
(adjusted) South Africa 0.741 7.366127744 
 Botswana 0.559 7.870525791 
 Namibia 0.555 7.811357447 
 Zambia 0.523 6.427933792 
 Swaziland 0.52 7.625161417 
 Zimbabwe 0.488 4.308080892 
 Mozambique 0.483 5.23079357 
 Seychelles 0.481 7.39581686 
 Mauritius 0.466 8.186706935 
 Lesotho 0.386 7.499251603 
 Malawi 0.367 5.750041671 
 Tanzania 0.364 7.26060323 
 Madagascar 0.343 5.864701176 
 Dem Rep of Congo 0.302 5.743211571 
 Angola 0.281 6.065583361 
CEN-SAD 
(adjusted) Cote d'Ivoire 0.641 6.6948113 
 Benin 0.587 6.626199593 
 Togo 0.581 6.218544758 
 Senegal 0.569 6.014800903 
 Niger 0.553 6.847945767 
 Mali 0.542 6.74588757 
 Burkina Faso 0.538 6.524377079 
 Gambia 0.419 6.75185889 
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 Ghana 0.418 6.849823589 
 Nigeria 0.384 7.349102039 
 Guinea 0.349 6.608530123 
 Kenya 0.344 7.285672899 
 Mauritania 0.331 6.380096816 
 Chad 0.329 4.906243704 
 Guinea-Bissau 0.322 6.334990223 
 
Central African 
Republic 0.303 5.255901557 
 Liberia 0.252 5.997896268 
ECCAS 
(adjusted) Cameroon 0.664 6.288674279 
 Gabon 0.58 6.590276872 
 Rep of Congo 0.531 5.536996435 
 Chad 0.512 4.906243704 
 
Central African 
Republic 0.507 5.255901557 
 Rwanda 0.485 8.37415247 
 Angola 0.325 6.065583361 
 Burundi 0.276 7.274866867 
 Dem Rep Congo 0.196 5.743211571 
ECOWAS 
(adjusted) Cote d'Ivoire 0.675 6.6948113 
 Togo 0.671 6.218544758 
 Senegal 0.628 6.014800903 
 Niger 0.556 6.847945767 
 Benin 0.548 6.626199593 
 Ghana 0.546 6.849823589 
 Burkina Faso 0.537 6.524377079 
 Mali 0.525 6.74588757 
 Nigeria 0.501 7.349102039 
 Guinea-Bissau 0.5 6.334990223 
 Gambia 0.447 6.75185889 
 Cape Verde 0.439 6.679492305 
 Liberia 0.357 5.997896268 
 Guinea 0.301 6.608530123 
 Sierra Leone 0.404 4.660122023 
IGAD Kenya 0.773 7.285672899 
 Uganda 0.701 7.894807884 






Multiple R 0.267934064 
R Square 0.071788663 
Adjusted R Square 0.059412512 





The second dataset includes all instances of regional integration within the proposed 
tripartite union of the SADC, EAC, and COMESA from the AFRICA Regional Integration Index 




























Report. Instances are grouped by REC and descend in order of most integrated to least within 
each REC. 
REC Member State Regional Integration Score Regulation Score 
COMESA 
(adjusted) Kenya 0.573 7.285672899 
 Zambia 0.565 6.427933792 
 Uganda 0.52 7.894807884 
 Seychelles 0.506 7.39581686 
 Mauritius 0.47 8.186706935 
 Zimbabwe 0.454 4.308080892 
 Rwanda 0.45 8.37415247 
 Madagascar 0.42 5.864701176 
 Dem Rep of Congo 0.419 5.743211571 
 Malawi 0.412 5.750041671 
 Burundi 0.401 7.274866867 
 Swaziland 0.359 7.625161417 
 Ethiopia 0.233 6.046571454 
EAC Kenya 0.656 7.285672899 
 Uganda 0.577 7.894807884 
 Rwanda 0.553 8.37415247 
 Burundi 0.48 7.274866867 
 Tanzania 0.433 7.26060323 
SADC 
(adjusted) South Africa 0.741 7.366127744 
 Botswana 0.559 7.870525791 
 Namibia 0.555 7.811357447 
 Zambia 0.523 6.427933792 
 Swaziland 0.52 7.625161417 
 Zimbabwe 0.488 4.308080892 
 Mozambique 0.483 5.23079357 
 Seychelles 0.481 7.39581686 
 Mauritius 0.466 8.186706935 
 Lesotho 0.386 7.499251603 
 Malawi 0.367 5.750041671 
 Tanzania 0.364 7.26060323 
 Madagascar 0.343 5.864701176 
 Dem Rep of Congo 0.302 5.743211571 






Multiple R 0.362788352 
R Square 0.131615388 
Adjusted R Square 0.103602981 





The data above and the regression analysis shows a robust and significant relationship 
between domestic economic freedom and regional integration independent of other variables. 
Domestic reforms supporting economic freedom do play a causal role in regional integration in 




























integration, while historically part-and-parcel of building RECs, is likely counterproductive.44  
For the “Legal System and Property Rights” scores, the regression suggests a 5.3% causality for 
regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa states as a whole and 15.9% for the COMESA-SADC-
EAC bloc. For “Regulation,” scores, the regression suggests a 5.9% causality for regional 
integration in Sub-Saharan Africa states as a whole and 10.3% for the COMESA-SADC-EAC bloc. 
It can also be noted that the number of observations and the p-values of the various analyses 
support rejecting the null hypothesis.  
 These significant relationships are even more important when one considers the other 
major factors affecting regional integration, such as roads and infrastructure, stable currency, 
presence of complementary industries, etc. In other words, despite the influence of factors 
without which regional integration would be virtually impossible (lack of quality infrastructure, 
for example), purely domestic reforms toward economic freedom have between 5.3% and 
15.9% causality for regional integration as a whole. The possible causality outlined in the 
introduction, as well as the case study to follow, suggests that economic freedom also works in 
a complementary fashion with other pro-regional integration reforms and policies on the 
political level by empowering the private sector to influence state decision-making.   
 In addition to this strong quantitative evidence, this study requires a descriptive theory 
of how the relationship manifests in actual political and economic history. There are still 
questions as to paths of causality, which actors play significant roles, and the precise role of the 
private sector relative to the public sector. A case study, taking into account both theoretical 
and historical evidence, can contribute to filling these gaps and reveal the potential causal 
                                                                
44 De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 19. 
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mechanisms between economic freedom and regional integration—in other words, how 
economic freedom and an empowered private sector actually contribute to regional 
integration. This project will therefore utilize one, using the “plausibility probe” method to 
uncover potential evidence and patterns for further research.45  
 
Case Study Methodology 
The second part of this project offers a case study exploring possible causal explanations 
for the regression results, which in instances show a significant relationship between domestic 
economic freedom and regional integration. While the introductory literature review suggests 
some general possible causal paths, it does not explore any specific scenario in detail. Specific 
case studies, as McNabb argues, can be integral in developing causal explanations to predict 
future behavior.46 Case studies, if well-designed, can be used to test specific theories and 
develop new ones. In addition, the methodology of a case study should be cross-applicable to 
other situations to allow for further testing of a theories. According to George and Bennett, this 
data gathering proceeds by asking general questions that can be applied to any relevant case.47 
These questions, if they can be asked of any case a theory is purported to explain, facilitate 
external validity through comparative cases.  
While there are several possible methods that case studies can employ to uncover 
relevant information, only a few promise the potential to contribute to this analysis. This 
                                                                
45 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. BCSIA 
Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005, 75 
46 David McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science : Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 2nd ed. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2010, 227. 
47 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 86 
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current project does not attempt a multivariate analysis nor does it attempt to form a 
comprehensive causal theory. In many case studies, the focus is on exploring or explaining a 
primary causal variable key to a theoretical framework. The quantitative data upon which this 
case study will be built only finds the causal relationship from economic freedom to regional 
integration to be between 5.3% and 15.9% (for both measures). Because of this, it is likely that 
economic freedom is not the single largest causal factor of regional integration success, but 
only a significant contributing factor.  
The struggle with all case studies is controlling for alternative causes and focusing on the 
most likely causal story.48 While researchers may focus on a single case in theory development 
or testing, George and Bennett suggest that the traditional single case study is limited and that 
comparative work is more likely to yield externally valid results and address the problem of 
alternative causes.49 Though a comparative study would be more advantageous, this paper will 
only examine the single case of Botswana. This does not mean this particular example is 
useless. The methodology (specifically the questions asked of this case and the indicators 
found) can be cross-applied to other Sub-Saharan cases. In addition, Botswana can be 
considered a version of what George and Bennett call a “crucial case.”50 The crucial case study 
methodology argues that in the event that a theory is sufficiently precise in its predictions, a 
“crucial-case study” can be relevant despite the “n=1 problem”.51 Harry Eckstein argues that 
“crucial-case studies…may permit sufficiently precise theories to be refuted by one 
                                                                
48 Ibid., 207. 
49 Ibid., 230. 
50 Ibid., 253. 
51 King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton Paperbacks, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, 208-9 
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observation.”52 While Eckstein’s original conception of the crucial-case study has serious 
methodological issues, his logic regarding the limits of single crucial case studies can be utilized 
to frame this project’s case study. Henry Brady and David Collier, in Rethinking Social Inquiry, 
have a more favorable view of the crucial case study, arguing that “what matters…is that a 
causal mechanism has been identified, and the researcher has some framework within which to 
begin to investigate the validity of the causal claim.”53 
Since this project examines a smaller variable than typical crucial case studies, it will not 
attempt to justify a monocausal explanation, but will present a “plausibility probe.” These are 
described as “preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine 
whether more intensive…testing is warranted.”54 With the quantitative portion as a foundation, 
this case study will attempt to tease out evidence supporting the contention that economic 
freedom’s facilitation of the private sector supports regional integration.  
Widely considered one of the most economically free states in Africa, Botswana also 
scores high on the AFRICA Regional Integration Index. Because of its prima facie correlation of 
the hypothesis, Botswana can be considered an alternative version of the crucial case study 
that does not attempt to disprove the hypothesis by testing a precise theory, but still has the 
potential to suggest the null hypothesis. If no qualitative evidence of policies promoting 
economic freedom and the facilitation of the private sector leading to increased regional 
integration can be found, then the theoretical causal mechanism will be “strongly impugned.”55 
                                                                
52 Ibid., 209. 
53 Brady, Henry E., and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Lanham, Md; 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, 163. 
54 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 75. 
55 Ibid., 253. 
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If a relationship can be found, however, then further study into the precise mechanisms on a 
larger scale may be warranted and the theory will have passed a small, but important test of 
legitimacy. 
This brief case study tests the plausibility of the hypothesis that a partial solution to 
regional integration may be found in the private sector. As noted in previous sections, if it is 
true that “the private sector will be responsible for the bulk of economic decisions which are 
the fabric of regional integration,” then domestic policy facilitating private sector activity may 
be a part of the causal story of regional integration.56 With domestic economic freedom (which 
can be understood as a proxy for private sector facilitation) already shown to be a 
quantitatively likely causal factor in regional integration, this case study will tease out the some 
of the historical causal mechanisms and actions by which this happens. It will specifically look 
for patterns and observations concerning private-public coordination on policy measures and 
data regarding NTBs (which, as shown, feature heavily in discussions of the private sector and 
regional integration). 57 
 
Case Study: Botswana 
Botswana has long been an interesting exception to many of the pathologies that have 
plagued post-colonial African states. Since independence in 1966, Botswana has enjoyed 
“uninterrupted civilian leadership, progressive social policies, and significant capital 
investment.”58 It boasts a multi-party democracy, though the Botswana Democratic Party has 
                                                                
56 Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 19. 
57 De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 19. 




controlled the government since independence.59 Its judiciary is considered relatively 
independent, and is considered one of the least corrupt states in Africa. It is a relatively small 
parliamentary republic of just over 2 million people, but “maintained one of the world's highest 
economic growth rates since independence” until the 2008 financial crisis. While a significant 
portion of its economy depends on diamond and other mineral exports, Botswana has generally 
avoided the governance issues associated with dependence on natural resources (referred to as 
the “resource curse”).60 The government of Botswana has made repeated efforts to invest in 
human capital and education to diversify its economy, to mixed success. A landlocked state, 
Botswana has made regional cooperation and trade a priority, and even hosts the headquarters 
of the SADC.  
 Unlike most African states, Botswana is a member of only one REC, the SADC. The 
AFRICA Regional Integration Index gives Botswana’s integration with the SADC a score of .559, 
second to only South Africa, the largest economy in the SADC (and depending on the year, 
Africa). The AFRICA Regional Integration Index further notes:  
At 8 percent of GDP, Botswana has the sixth-highest share of intra-SADC 
exports to GDP (excluding re-exports) among the 13 members of the bloc 
for which data was available. It also has the third-highest share of intra-
SADC imports to GDP among the 15 members, amounting to 37 percent of 
GDP. Indeed, given that SADC appears to be the most trade-integrated 
regional economic community on the continent, Botswana scores strongly 
in this dimension overall relative to other African countries. However, 
trade between Botswana and other SADC member States may not be as 
high as it could be because of limited complementarity of goods.61  
 
                                                                
59 U.S. Department of State. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Botswana.” Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2011. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186379.pdf 
60 See S. Erdem Aytaç, Michael Mousseau, and Ömer Faruk Örsün. "Why Some Countries Are Immune from the 
Resource Curse: The Role of Economic Norms." Democratization 23, no. 1 (2014): 1-22.  




In terms of economic freedom, Botswana is an exceptional case. The Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2017 Annual Report gives Botswana an overall score 7.37, and on the sub-scores of 
“Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation” Botswana scores 6.16 and 7.87, 
respectively. These scores place Botswana at 50th worldwide and 3rd in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
behind only Mauritius at 7th worldwide and Rwanda at 31st worldwide.62 
 Despite placing behind Mauritius and Rwanda in economic freedom, Botswana is the 
preferable state of study. Both Mauritius and Rwanda have unique issues that make them less 
than ideal for examining regional integration policy over time. In the case of Rwanda, the 1994 
genocide during which close to a million Tutsis were killed by the Hutu government represents 
something like a critical juncture, which severely complicates any political analysis. Any 
examination of Rwanda would necessarily take into account the genocide and reforms that 
followed from it as central to Rwanda’s current state. In short, Rwanda represents an atypical 
situation from which little comparative data is likely to be useful for the question of this study. 
The other possible case, Mauritius, is an island state 1,200 miles off the African Coast. While 
technically included in analyses of Sub-Saharan Africa, as an island not part of the African 
continent proper, it also is an exception to the more typical Sub-Saharan state. For this and 
other reasons, suffice it to say that conclusions drawn from a study of Mauritius would not 
likely be cross-applicable to continental African states. On the other hand, Botswana represents 
an excellent case with a high economic freedom score, a landlocked status on continental 
                                                                
62 Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike, Richard Grant, Fred McMahon, 
Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati, Economic Freedom. 
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Africa, and a relevant policy pattern that can be, as will be shown, traced back to the early 
1990s.  
In late 2013, the Republic of Botswana published an article entitled “Government 
Partners with Private Sector” on their official website. It detailed the remarks of the Vice 
President of Botswana, Dr. Ponatshego Kedikilwe, at a conference in Botswana. The Vice 
President’s speech included references to several important current and historical elements 
that directly pertain to policies promoting economic freedom and business, to the political 
representation of private industry, and to private-public coordination on policy measures.  
Regarding policies promoting economic freedom, one of the most notable political 
events is the passage of Incomes Policy of 1990, which “was aimed at improving the growth of 
the private sector by removing red tape and promoting free markets.”63 This policy reform 
specifically removed price controls for wages implemented in the 1972 Incomes Policy under 
the idea that “the private sector had…grown and needed to be de-linked from the government 
pay structure to encourage its growth and competitiveness.”64 While some minimum wages 
laws were retained for specific classes of workers, the 1990 Policy represented a major shift in a 
previously highly-regulated market. In addition, this policy is also remarkable because it was 
implemented domestically and “voluntarily” (in contrast to structural adjustment programs or 
                                                                
63 "Government Partners with Private Sector," Republic of Botswana - Government Portal. February 12, 2013, 
Accessed April 20, 2018, http://www.gov.bw/en/News/GOVERNMENT-PARTNERS-WITH-PRIVATE-SECTOR/. 
64 Happy Kufigwa Siphambe, “Development Strategies and Poverty Reduction in Botswana,” In Poverty Reduction 
and Changing Policy Regimes in Botswana, Ed. Onalenna Selolwane, Developmental Pathways to Poverty 
Reduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012: 52. 
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other international intervention).65 This voluntary adoption seems to be a product of 
Botswana’s governing economic philosophy. Happy Kufigwa Siphambe writes that Botswana’s…  
…development strategy has been based on the philosophy of free 
enterprise and a market economy, and successive national development 
plans have always emphasised that the role of the government in the 
economy is that of a facilitator of economic growth and development 
rather than an active participant.66 
 
The themes of economic freedom, open markets, and government non-interference have been 
consistent across time in government rhetorical signaling, in addition to the data already 
presented. Take the following quote as a further example: 
“The government’s approach towards economic development is to have 
the private sector as the engine of growth and we have formulated 
privatisation policy which should enable the private sector to play an 
increased role in the various sectors of the economy,” he said. …“Our 
decision has been vindicated by evidence that economies prosper and lift 
people out of poverty when government focuses on good regulation and 
creation of an enabling environment, while the private sector is allowed to 
get on with the business of business,” the vice President said.67 
 
The Vice President’s speech at the conference closely correlates Siphambe’s assertion of the 
government’s stance toward the private sector and economic freedom.  
 Botswana has a demonstrable positive stance toward economic freedom and the 
private sector, but has this stance resulted in the robust (and political) private sector that the 
hypothesis would predict? It seems so—the report of the conference mentions positively two 
institutions that facilitate public-private conversation and policy-making in Botswana: the High 
                                                                
65 Happy Kufigwa Siphambe, "Botswana's Economy and Labour Market: Are There Any Lessons for SADC Regional 
Integration?" Development Southern Africa 21, no. 2 (2004): 355 
66 Ibid., 355. 
67 "Government Partners with Private Sector.” 
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Level Consultative Council (HLCC) and the Botswana Economic Advisory Council (BEAC). This 
paper will focus on the HLCC.  
 The HLCC, founded in 1996 as part of the “Vision 2016” document and “described as a 
‘people’s manifesto’ for long-term development of the country, argues that Botswana ‘cannot 
afford an adversarial relationship between Government and business’.”68 The Vision 2016 “was 
itself a particularly inclusive process in which the private sector was given considerable 
opportunity to shape thinking,” resulting in lasting public-private dialogue and partnerships, the 
final form of which was the HLCC.69  
 The HLCC, which is chaired by the president and filled with representatives from various 
industries and businesses, has the goal of facilitating private sector growth, which often means 
removing government-imposed obstacles. As a forum for the private sector to propose dialogue 
and push policy, the HLCC boasts numerous documented successes over the years:  
A number of policies and initiatives are thus now in place that arose from 
the National Business Conference and the HLCC. Significant examples 
include the following: 
• establishment of the HLCC itself; 
• establishment of the Botswana Export Development and 
Investment Agency (BEDIA); 
• the decision to scrap foreign-exchange controls; 
• promotion of citizen economic empowerment which led to 
creation of the Citizen Entrepreneur Development Agency;  
• initiation of the debate on privatisation which led to the 
adoption of a policy on privatization….70 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                                
68 Anthony Land, “Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue: The Experience from Botswana,” European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, 2002: 7 
69 Ibid., 9. 
70 Ibid., 12. 
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While not a complete list, the emphasized portions illustrate a significant commitment on 
behalf of Botswana political forces to policies that facilitate business and foreign engagements 
(the foreign-exchange controls being one). The HLCC has certainly seen historic success, though 
recently some concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the HLCC after the 
retirement of long-reigning President Festus Mogae.71 Regardless, in making a case for causal 
mechanisms, the positive feedback loop of the economic freedom, private sector political 
participation, and Botswana’s economic performance are only supported by this evidence.  
 In regards to the second set of data, the link between policies promoting economic 
freedom domestically and reducing NTBs is partially axiomatic. As previously noted, NTBs can 
include a wide variety of phenomena. Wentworth includes a short list of the most common: 
NTBs are restrictions imposed by government policies, private sector 
practices or protectionist industry actions against foreign companies. They 
include import bans or product specific quotas; complex or discriminatory 
rules of origin; complex procedures and administrative requirements; 
unreasonable technical standards; multiplicity of foreign exchange 
controls; and lack of adequate physical infrastructure. These impediments 
increase the cost and complexity of trading and doing business across 
borders.72 
 
Policies supporting domestic economic freedom by definition include addressing several of 
these issues. Measurement of at least some of these NTB categories is already included in the 
Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report. The two categories this study examines 
(“Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation”) already measure bureaucracy costs, 
credit regulations, regulatory and costs of property sale, all of which parallel Wentworth’s list to 
                                                                
71 "HLCC INDEED NEEDS REVIEW." Sunday Standard. January 28, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2018. 
http://www.sundaystandard.info/hlcc-indeed-needs-review. 





some degree. As an aside, the NTB of a “multiplicity of foreign exchange controls,” the 
elimination of which in Botswana is an accomplishment of the HCLL, represents an example of a 
significant direct private sector act toward building regional integration.  
 Perhaps more enlightening than the obvious connection between domestic freedom 
and the elimination of NTBs is the realized practice of this in Botswana. Thomas and Marandu 
conducted an extensive study of Small and Medium Enterprises in Botswana and their 
perspectives on South African trade. Most striking is the frustration of Botswana businesses 
with the inefficiencies of neighboring states:  
[They found] in interviews with numerous SME in Botswana a consistent 
frustration at the comparative issues in exporting to surrounding nations—
non standardization of permits, visas, etc. duties, vague regulatory 
standards, [and] arbitrary taxes…73 
 
The problems were not unique to any particular sector, but nearly universal. Further, their 
study correlates previous data that “African manufacturers in countries that have trade 
restrictions, cumbersome regulations and deficient customs administration, tend to be unlikely 
to export.”74 The study further suggests that even though Botswana has conducted domestic 
reforms with potential to aid its export capacity and regional integration (on which it already 
scores well in the AFRICA Regional Integration Index), it is probably held back by inefficiencies 
in surrounding states. This likely contributes to the upper limit of domestic economic freedom’s 
contribution to regional integration. Even when a state’s businesses are ready and willing to 
form regional connections, if the surrounding states do not already have a domestic 
                                                                
73 Thomas, A. O., and E. Marandu, "Rhetoric and realities of regional integration: Botswana SME perspectives on 
Southern African trade," South African Journal of Business Management 48, no. 2, 2017: 81. 
74 Ibid., 81.  
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commitment to economic freedom, it limits private sector movement in all states. So while the 
causal story of the economic freedom of property rights and regulations leading to political 
cooperation and facilitation of good domestic policy with private sector feedback, any given 
state ultimately will be limited by the degree to which its fellow REC members domestically 
commit to economic freedom. Despite this, the prospect of establishing a virtuous circle that 
both builds the business networks necessarily for regional integration and the political will to 
maintain them is an enticing one and is likely worth pursuing.  
 While there are numerous alternative and complementary factors in regional 
integration and private sector facilitation (infrastructure featuring high on the list), this study 
will not attempt to reconcile them with the data and analysis already presented, as their 
importance is already well-established. This study’s purpose has been to determine the degree 
to which economic freedom can influence regional integration and establish its limits. So while 
a clear and complete causal pattern is not certain due to the aforementioned overlapping 
factors, there remains sufficient evidence to support the level of causality that the data 
suggests, warranting further research into the political effects of strengthening the private 
sector on policies that support and/or hinder regional integration efforts.  
 
Conclusion and Further Research 
While this study has made a foray into the question of domestic economic freedom and 
regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, the question is far from resolved. More precise 
quantitative measures and differing metrics could add nuance and specificity as to which 
policies within the broad category of economic freedom carry the most causal weight on each 
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of the various aspects of regional integration. Other permutations and indices could be utilized 
to conduct broad examinations of under-examined factors. For example, perhaps policies 
exclusively concerning property rights, possibly measured by the International Property Rights 
Index, are more relevant than those concerning regulation or other facets of economic 
freedom.75 It is also possible that purely pro-business policies, over which economic freedom 
only partially overlaps, provide a better dataset to examine, perhaps measured with the World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index.  
One potential weakness of this study is its lack of multivariate analysis. However, this 
likely could be constructed rather quickly using the subcategory data from the Economic 
Freedom of the World: 2017 and AFRICA Regional Integration Index. One also could quibble 
with the design of the AFRICA Regional Integration Index and its designation of equal weight 
among its factors. Focusing on one or two factors to the exclusion of others also may prove a 
rich opportunity for research.  
As already noted on the case study portion of the paper, a single case provides limited 
evidence. While enough of a causal pattern was found to justify further examination, that 
examination, both of cases that seem to fit the hypothesis and those that do not, has yet to be 
undertaken. While the quantitative analysis and plausibility probe both uphold a strong 
relationship between domestic economic freedom and regional integration, a precise and 
nuanced causal theory is less than fully established. This does not mean that one cannot draw 
implications for development policy and governance. This study’s findings are consistent with 
                                                                
75 For a starting point on this tangent, see www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/botswana 
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other scholars who find strong correlations between economic freedom and various kinds of 
advanced economic development. Domestic policy that removes NTBs and empowers the 
private sector by improving legal institutions and limiting excessive regulations can be a path to 
both domestic growth and regional integration. This opportunity for facilitating regional 
integration through domestic policy—that is, without requiring political cooperation from the 
various states—is a route less-examined but worthy of further explication. This study offers a 
useful starting point, but much work remains to be done to tease out the full breadth of the 
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Appendix 2: On Faith and Learning 
 
 
I lived in Uganda, East Africa, for five years while my parents worked at an NGO that 
offered education, housing, medical services, vocational training, and community to orphans, 
at-risk children, and young adults. Africa was foreign much of the time, but it was still home. 
And as a kid, living there meant riding through trails surrounded by tall bush, bumping along 
long red dirt roads, and endless hours under the hot sun. Now, as a student finishing my 
undergraduate thesis examining economic policy across Sub-Saharan Africa, my gaze has 
expanded and been informed by the numerous sources of knowledge I have been privileged to 
encounter. These sources include practicing my Catholic Christian faith, befriending students 
from diverse and divergent background on SPU’s campus, studying under brilliant and generous 
professors, reading post-colonial literature at Oxford University, building my personal library 
(beliefs alongside), and learning the complexities of political science, my undergraduate field of 
study. 
The Gospel says “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” There is 
a sentiment in the verse that echoes, I think, to both my faith and my profession. Political 
science has the duty to pursue objective, empirical truth (inasmuch as a social science can), and 
this honors project has been an attempt to contribute to that. Its goal is to hypothesize and 
test, seeking to avoid mistakes, manage uncertainty, and seek the best possible solutions to the 
problems that civilizations face. It also has the duty to explicate what we know of human 
nature, and to project systems and ideals grappling with its contours.  
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On the most basic level, then, my attachment to this honors project is both personal 
(from my childhood) and professional (from my intellectual focus). Underlying both is a 
commitment to service. As Christians, we are called to use our talents to serve those around us. 
This project, which aims to contribute to poverty alleviation and forward stable political 
institutions, is an important and worthwhile task for a Christian to pursue. While much progress 
still needs to be made, there is (in my experience as one once deeply involved in Christian 
missionary work and now as a student of political science) an ever-growing recognition of the 
complexity of both political and mission work and the mistakes that have been made due to 
simplistic thinking.  
But of what nature is this progress? The Glory Be is a simple prayer, expressing faith in a 
triune God, and affirming an eschatological “end” to reality— 
Glory be to the Father, 
and to the Son, 
and to the Holy Spirit. 
As it was in the beginning, 
is now, 
and ever shall be, 
world without end. 
Amen. 
While this prayer expresses confidence, it is not confidence in the future, but in the ever-
present now that will not pass from the safety of God’s hand. The world, whatever state it may 
be in, does not contradict and cannot subsume the larger reality the Glory Be affirms. Human 
progress pales in comparison to the timeless truth the prayer latches onto. As it was in the 
beginning, is now, and ever shall be… 
Politics, on the other hand, has always been something closer to constant crisis 
management. We have found, through decades of experimentation and loss, that some ideas 
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work, and that some ideas do not. While there are no universal axioms by which to perfectly 
imagine a society, there are rules that have proven by-and-large successful across time and 
space. These rules only have ever promised limited success, no matter the arena—and this is 
how it should be. This is the nature of politics, which depends not on an unmoved mover, but 
the ebbing minds and hearts of the mover’s creation. Political science, in its proper expression, 
is a humble science, accepting a limited understanding of humanity and possibility. 
The arrogance of doctrine, theological, political, or otherwise, that treats humans as 
means to end, humans as simple cogs or forces, and assumes the mantle of wisdom to remake 
society in its image must always be rejected. Humans are not clay to be molded (only the Potter 
may do that). Humans cannot write wholly just laws (only the Lawgiver may do that). Humans 
cannot lead eternally or unfailingly (only the King may do that). Too many post-independence 
projects in Africa and around the world have promised this utopia and cast its adherents into 
only greater misery. But what, then, are we left with if we must abandon our worldly hope? Is 
waiting for death and spiritual renewal all we have? A thousand times, no. 
The response is to be humble, to be careful, to be kind. The alternative to this arrogance 
and wild certainty is to embrace the Christian principle of tension, as Leszek Kolakowski, the 
eminent political philosopher describes: 
Christianity has neither found nor promised any lasting solution to man’s temporal lot. It 
has thus provided us with a way out of the pessimism/optimism dilemma, if it is seen as 
a dilemma between belief in the ultimate solutions and despair. The generation into 
despair is common among those who once believed in a perfect and ultimate solution and 
later lost that certainty. But it is the tradition of Christian teaching to shield us from both 
these perils: from the wild certainty of our infinite capacity for perfection on the one hand 
and from suicide on the other. (Modernity on Endless Trial)  
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My project seeks to walk the line that Christianity itself does, between the twin destructions of 
utopia and anarchy. My project, informed by faith and humility, hopes to take a step towards 
limited good.  
 
 
